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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits 
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between January 
1, 2017 and August 17, 2017.  This collection, written by the members of 
the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and criminal matters, 
and then by subject matter and court. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and it intended 
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, and not a 
comprehensive analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 14 SETON 
HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2017). 
 
CIVIL MATTERS 
 
Administrative Law .............................................................................. 94 
Allina Health Servs. v. Price, 863 F.3d 937 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ......... 94 
Modoc Lassen Indian Hous. Auth. v. United States HUD, 864 F.3d 
1212 (10th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................ 95 
Civil Procedure ..................................................................................... 96 
SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & 
Power Dist., 859 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 2017) ....................................... 96 
Rarick v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co., 852 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2017) .. 96 
Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017) ................. 97 
Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA Sec. of P.R., Inc., 852 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 
2017) ................................................................................................... 97 
Pepper v. Apple Inc., 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................ 98 
United States ex rel. Chorches v. Am. Med Response, Inc., 865 
F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017) ....................................................................... 98 
City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., 864 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 
2017) ................................................................................................... 98 
92 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 14:91 
Civil Rights ............................................................................................ 99 
EEOC v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 15-3452, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15228 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2017) ......................................................... 99 
Constitutional Law ............................................................................... 99 
Lazar v. Kroncke, 862 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................... 99 
United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017) .. 100 
Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677 (6th Cir. 2017) ................................ 101 
Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2017) .......................... 101 
Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2017) . 101 
Contract Law ....................................................................................... 102 
Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2017) ...................... 102 
Employment/Labor Law .................................................................... 102 
Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist., 859 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017)
 .......................................................................................................... 102 
Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017)
 .......................................................................................................... 103 
 Hills v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 866 F.3d 610 (5th Cir. 2017) . 103 
Hitchcock v. Cumberland Univ. 403(b) DC Plan, 851 F.3d 552 (6th 
Cir. 2017) ......................................................................................... 103 
McKeen-Chaplin v. Provident Sav. Bank, 862 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 
2017) ................................................................................................. 104 
Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017) .. 104 
Holt v. Pennsylvania, 683 F. App’x 151 (3d Cir. 2017) ................ 105 
NLRB v. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017) ............. 106 
Convergys Corp. v. NLRB, No. 15-60860, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 
14521 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2017) ......................................................... 106 
Vaughan v. Anderson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 849 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 
2017) ................................................................................................. 107 
Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2017)
 .......................................................................................................... 107 
Environmental law .............................................................................. 107 
Asarco LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017) 107 
2017] Current Circuit Splits 93 
Health Law .......................................................................................... 108 
Reese v. CNH Indus. N.V., 854 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 2017) ............. 108 
Immigration Law ................................................................................ 109 
Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2017) .......................... 109 
Pereira v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) .............................. 109 
Intellectual Property ........................................................................... 110 
Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 2017 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16632 (9th Cir. 2017) .......................................................... 110 
Securities Law ..................................................................................... 110 
Somers v. Digital Realty Trust, Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017)
 .......................................................................................................... 110 
Tax Law ............................................................................................... 111 
BC Ranch II, L.P. v. Commissioner, Nos. 16-60068, 16-60069, 2017 
U.S. App. LEXIS 14947 (5th Cir. Aug. 11, 2017) ......................... 111 
CRIMINAL MATTERS 
Assault .................................................................................................. 112 
United States v. Villasenor-Ortiz, 675 Fed. App’x 424 (5th Cir. 
2017) ................................................................................................. 112 
Constitutional Law ............................................................................. 112 
Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2017) .................. 112 
Criminal Law ...................................................................................... 113 
United States v. Lee, No.16-6288, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11680 
(10th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................... 113 
United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122 (11th Cir. 2017) ........... 113 
United States v. Davis, 854 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2017) ................ 113 
United States v. Archuleta, 865 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017) ........ 114 
Criminal Procedure ............................................................................ 114 
United States v. Sneed, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13905 (11th Cir. 
2017) ................................................................................................. 114 
Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, 856 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2017) ......... 115 
94 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 14:91 
United States v. Collins, 854 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) ............. 115 
United States v. Hankins, 858 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2017) ............. 116 
Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2017)
 .......................................................................................................... 116 
United States v. Anderson, No. 16-3134, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 
14484 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2017) ......................................................... 117 
United States v. Chavez-Meza, 854 F.3d 655 (10th Cir. 2017) .... 117 
McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, 851 F.3d 1076 
(11th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................... 118 
Fillingham v. United States, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14925 (5th Cir. 
2017) ................................................................................................. 118 
United States v. Doe, No. 17-604, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14371 
(10th Cir. Aug. 4, 2017) .................................................................. 119 
United States v. Burke, 863 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 2017) ............... 119 
Immigration Law ................................................................................ 120 
Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2017) ............... 120 
Property Crimes .................................................................................. 120 
United States v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) ...................... 120 
Sentencing ............................................................................................ 121 
United States v. Koons, 850 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2017) .................. 121 
United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2017) ..................... 122 
Statutes ................................................................................................. 122 
United States v. Guillen-Cruz, 853 F.3d 768 (5th Cir. 2017) ....... 122 
 
CIVIL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Applicability of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking to the Medicare 
Act – Administrative Procedure Act: Allina Health Servs. v. Price, 863 
F.3d 937 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether the Medicare Act incorporates 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s) exemption for notice and 
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comment rule-making as applied to interpretive rules.  Id. at  945.  The 
court noted that the 1st, 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits have concluded that all 
of the APA’s exemptions to the notice and comment requirement are 
incorporated by the Medicare Act.  Id.  The court concluded that “[u]nlike 
the APA, the text of the Medicare Act does not exempt interpretive rules 
from notice-and-comment rulemaking,” but instead, “the text expressly 
requires notice-and-comment rulemaking.”  Id. at 944 (emphasis in 
original).  Therefore, the D.C. Circuit held that “the Medicare Act does not 
incorporate the APA’s interpretive-rule exception to the notice-and-
comment requirement.”  Id. at 945. 
Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act 
(NAHASDA) – Entitlement to Administrative Hearing: Modoc 
Lassen Indian Hous. Auth. v. United States HUD, 864 F.3d 1212 (10th 
Cir. 2017) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) lacked authority to recapture 
overpayments resulting from the over-reporting of eligible housing units 
by Native American tribes, without first providing an administrative 
hearing.  Id. at 1216.  The court explained that under section 4165 of 
the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act 
(NAHASDA), HUD was required to undertake such reviews and audits as 
may be necessary or appropriate to make three specific determinations; (1) 
whether each tribe “carried out its eligible activities in a timely 
manner, . . . carried out its eligible activities and certifications in 
accordance with the requirements and the primary objectives of this 
chapter and with other applicable laws, and has a continuing capacity to 
carry out those activities in a timely manner”; (2) whether each tribe 
“complied with [its] Indian housing plan”; and (3) whether each tribe’s 
“performance reports . . . [were] accurate.”  Id. at 1218.  The 9th Circuit 
determined that a tribe’s report of eligible housing stock falls within the 
first category of section 4165, under “activities” and “certifications,” and 
as such affords the HUD the authority to review and entitles the tribe to an 
administrative hearing.  Id.  The court, however, disagreed with the 9th 
Circuit’s determination, as the “applicable statutes unambiguously 
establish that the terms ‘eligible activities’ and ‘certifications’ don’t 
encompass a tribe’s report on its eligible housing units.”  Id. at 1219.  Thus, 
the 10th Circuit concluded that HUD was under no obligation to afford the 
Tribes an administrative hearing since the HUD lacked authority to review 
such reports under section 4165.  Id. at 1220. 
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CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Appellate Jurisdiction – Collateral Order Doctrine: SolarCity Corp. 
v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 859 F.3d 720 
(9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit decided “whether [it could] consider the appeal 
immediately under the collateral-order doctrine, or whether any appeal 
based on state-action immunity must await final judgment.”  Id. at 722.  
The court noted that the 11th Circuit held that “state-action immunity was 
comparable to qualified immunity because both doctrines protected 
officials from “costly litigation and conclusory allegations.”  Id. at 729 
(internal citations omitted).  The court then noted the 5th Circuit similarly 
held that “state action immunity shares the essential element of absolute, 
qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunities,” and therefore could be 
immediately appealed.  Id.  On the other hand, the court noted the 6th 
Circuit held that “unsuccessful assertions of state-action immunity failed 
the second and third parts of the collateral-order test,” in which the 4th 
Circuit agreed.  Id. at 728.  The 9th Circuit was persuaded by the 4th and 
6th Circuits, and ultimately held that “the collateral-order doctrine does 
not allow an immediate appeal of an order denying a dismissal motion 
based on state-action immunity.”  Id. at 722. 
District Court Discretion – Declaratory Judgment Act: Rarick v. 
Federated Serv. Ins. Co., 852 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2017) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed the “legal standard a district court must 
apply when addressing whether it may decline jurisdiction when both 
declaratory and legal relief are claimed.”  Id. at 227–28 (internal citations 
and quotations omitted).  The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Circuits 
“have adopted a bright line rule that prioritizes a federal court’s duty to 
hear claims for legal relief over its discretion to decline jurisdiction to hear 
declaratory judgment actions,” while the 7th and 9th Circuits have applied 
“an independent claim test, which balances the court’s duty to hear legal 
claims with its discretion to decline jurisdiction over claims for declaratory 
relief.”  Id. at 228.  The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 7th and 9th Circuits in 
finding the “independent claim test” the most appropriate, noting that “it 
prevents plaintiffs from evading federal jurisdiction through artful 
pleading.”  Id.  Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that the “independent claim 
test” was the correct test to apply “for review of a complaint that seeks 
both legal and declaratory relief.”  Id. at 230. 
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Federal Arbitration Act – Arbitrability: Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 
857 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2017) 
The 1st Circuit addressed “whether the district court or the arbitrator 
decides the applicability of [an] exemption” to a transportation 
employment contract from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).  Id. at *12.  
The court noted the 8th Circuit held that the arbitrator may answer whether 
the exemption applies when the parties have agreed that the arbitrator may 
determine his or her jurisdiction.  Id. at *12–13.  The 9th Circuit disagreed, 
reasoning that if the FAA does not apply, the court has no authority to 
compel arbitration, so the court must first determine whether an exemption 
applies.  Id. at *13.  The 1st Circuit reasoned that the applicability of an 
exemption is a question of authority which presents an “antecedent 
determination” prior to compelling arbitration.  Id. at *14 (citation 
omitted).  The court noted that compelling arbitration over whether the 
court has the authority to do so “puts the cart before the horse and makes 
no sense.”  Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).  The 1st Circuit 
followed the 9th Circuit’s approach and concluded that the court must 
decide the applicability of an exemption before contemplating a motion to 
compel arbitration.  Id. at *15. 
Federal Question Jurisdiction – Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) Post-
Award Review: Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA Sec. of P.R., Inc., 852 F.3d 36 
(1st Cir. 2017) 
The 1st Circuit addressed “whether [the] difference in language 
between the pre-award enforcement provision of [9 U.S.C.] § 4 and the 
post-award enforcement provisions of [9 U.S.C.] §§ 9-11 warrants a 
different test for federal question jurisdiction.”  Id. at 44.  The court noted 
that the 2nd Circuit found that the look-through approach is applicable to 
§ 4 and at least § 10 petitions to vacate, while the 7th and 8th Circuits have 
held the opposite view—that a federal issue resolved by the arbitrator does 
not supply subject-matter jurisdiction for review or enforcement of the 
award.  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  The 1st Circuit agreed with the 
2nd Circuit in finding that the look-through approach cannot be limited to 
§ 4 petitions to compel because the mere textual difference between the 
sections does not indicate that the sections should be interpreted 
differently.  Id.  The court disagreed with the 7th and 8th Circuits in finding 
that it would make little sense to effectively exclude federal question 
jurisdiction over post-award arbitration cases given the important role 
federal courts have in enforcing these agreements.  Id. at 45.  Thus, the 1st 
Circuit concluded that the look-through approach may be applied to § 4 
and the post-award provisions of §§ 9-11.  Id. at 47. 
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Late-Filed Motions to Dismiss – Interpretation and Application of 
Rule 12(g)(2): Pepper v. Apple Inc., 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)(2) should 
be interpreted to foreclose a motion to dismiss when there has been a 
previous motion to dismiss under Rule 12.  Id. at 318.  The court noted 
that the 7th Circuit “has held that Rule 12(g)(2) does not foreclose a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) when there has been a previous 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12,” while the 3rd and 10th Circuits “have 
been very forgiving of a district court’s failure to follow Rule 12 (g)(2).”  
Id.  The 9th Circuit found that the 7th Circuit misunderstood Rule 12, 
instead following the approach of the 3rd and 10th Circuits, finding that 
“[d]enying late-filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions and relegating defendants to 
the three procedural avenues specified in Rule 12(h)(2) can produce 
unnecessary and costly delays, contrary to the direction of Rule 1,” and 
thus the appellate courts should “generally be forgiving of a district court’s 
ruling on the merits of a late-filed Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”  Id. at 318–19. 
Pleading Requirements – False Claims Act (FCA): United States ex 
rel. Chorches v. Am. Med Response, Inc., 865 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed “whether, to satisfy [FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)], 
an FCA relator alleging a fraudulent scheme must provide the details of 
specific examples of actual false claims presented to the government.”  Id. 
at 89.  The court noted that the 3rd, 5th 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have 
chosen a “more lenient” pleading standard, allowing alleged complaints 
that display no evidence of actual false claims to satisfy Rule 9(b).  Id.  In 
contrast, the 1st, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits have chosen a stricter Rule 
9(b) pleading standard, requiring actual evidence of alleged fraudulent 
conduct.  Id. at 89–90.  Ultimately, the 2nd Circuit held that Rule 9(b) does 
not require that every complaint provide specific evidence so long as the 
relator makes plausible allegations.  Id. at 93. 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Waiver By Participation: City of 
Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., 864 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2017) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether waiver by participation in state 
court proceedings “falls within either of the [28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)] bases 
[of remand]—(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or (2) any defect 
[other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction]”—and is therefore 
reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).  Id. at 1092.  Regarding the first 
basis of remand, the court noted that the 9th and 11th Circuits “treat[] 
waiver by participation as nonjurisdictional,” and specifically highlighted 
the 11th Circuit’s position that “[w]aiver may be a proper basis upon 
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which to find lack of removal jurisdiction; however, waiver does not 
divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Id. at 1094 (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  The court then noted that, in 
contrast, the 5th Circuit concluded that “a district court’s belief that 
removal was no longer available led ‘to the logical inference that [the 
district court] felt jurisdiction was lacking.’”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  The court ultimately agreed with the 9th and 11th Circuits, 
holding that “waiver by participation is independent from subject-matter 
jurisdiction,” and therefore “ . . . falls outside § 1447(c)’s subject-matter-
jurisdiction basis.”  Id.  Regarding the second basis of remand, the court 
agreed with the 4th, 7th, 9th, and 11th Circuit in holding that “‘any defect’ 
applies solely to failures to comply with the statutory requirement for 
removal.”  Id. 1095.  Ultimately, the 10th Circuit concluded that waiver 
does not qualify as “‘any defect’ under § 1447(c),” and therefore does not 
“limit [the court’s] jurisdiction to review the case’s merits.”  Id. at 1097–
98. 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
Business and Corporate Compliance – EEOC Investigative 
Authority Under Title VII: EEOC v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 15-3452, 
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15228 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2017) 
The 7th Circuit addressed “whether the [Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)] is authorized by statute to continue 
investigating an employer by seeking enforcement of its subpoena after 
issuing a notice of right-to-sue to the charging individuals and the 
dismissal of the individuals’ subsequent civil lawsuit on the merits.”  Id. 
at *6–7.  The court noted that the 5th Circuit ruled the issuance of a right-
to-sue letter ended the EEOC’s authority to investigate, while the 9th 
Circuit held that “the issuance of a right-to-sue letter does not strip the 
EEOC of authority to continue to process the charge, including 
independent investigation of allegations of discrimination on a company-
wide basis.”  Id. at *9.  The 7th Circuit agreed with the 5th Circuit and 
concluded that the EEOC may continue to investigate allegations of 
discrimination even after it issues a right-to-sue letter.  Id. at *11. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Contracts Clause – Revocation-On-Divorce Statute: Lazar v. 
Kroncke, 862 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether the operation of a revocation-on-
divorce statute (ROD) violates the Contracts Clause, a provision in the 
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United States Constitution that prevents any state from passing a law 
impairing the obligation of contracts.  Id. at 1198.  The court noted that the 
8th Circuit determined that an ROD statute was unconstitutional because 
of interference with the donative intent of a party in the contract, while the 
10th Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a ROD statute.  Id.  On the 
other hand, the 10th Circuit conceptualized the contract as having both 
contractual and donative transfer elements, and the Contracts Clause 
would only be violated if the statute interfered with both of those elements.  
Id. at 1199.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the 10th Circuit in finding that 
there was no contractual impairment if there was never a possession of 
vested contractual right.  Id. at 1200.  Ultimately, the 9th Circuit upheld 
the ROD statute as constitutional since there was no impairment of a 
contractual right.  Id. at 1200. 
 
Fifth Amendment Due Process – Deck Rule: United States v. Sanchez-
Gomez, 859 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed the issue of whether the rule in Deck v. 
Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005)—that the Constitution prohibits a 
requirement that a criminal defendant appear before a jury in shackles 
without an individual inquiry into the necessity of such security 
measures—applies to all court room proceedings.  Sanchez-Gomez, 859 
F.3d at 661.  The court noted the 2nd and 11th Circuits maintain that the 
rule requiring an individual inquiry into the necessity of shackles does not 
apply to non-jury proceedings and is limited only to jury trials.  Id. at 680–
81 (Ikuta, J. dissenting).  The court also noted that the 2nd Circuit found 
that a defendant is not prejudiced by shackles in a non-jury proceeding 
because judges are not so easily biased.  Id. at 681.  The majority did not 
acknowledge the existence of a split, but does not believe that the Deck 
rule is so limited.  Id. at 661.  The 9th Circuit reasoned the Court in Deck 
was more concerned with a criminal defendant’s presumption of 
innocence.  Id. at 660.  The court found that “a presumptively innocent 
defendant has the right to be treated with respect and dignity in a public 
courtroom, not like a bear on a chain.”  Id. at 661.  Thus, the 9th Circuit 
held “if the government seeks to shackle a defendant, it must first justify 
the infringement with specific security needs as to that particular 
defendant.”  Id. at 666. 
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First Amendment – Pickering Test: Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677 (6th 
Cir. 2017) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether employers must show evidence of 
actual disruption in the workplace in order to prevail under the Pickering 
test, promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in Pickering v. 
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  Miller, 845 F.3d at 685.  The 
court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Circuits determined 
that evidence of actual disruption is not required, while the 10th Circuit 
found that evidence of actual disruption of services must be produced.  Id. 
at 685–86.  The 6th Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th 
Circuits in finding that evidence of events unfolding to the extent of actual 
disruption in the office and to working relationships is unnecessary.  Id. at 
687.  The court disagreed with the 10th Circuit’s interpretation of the 
Pickering test, noting that the requirement of actual disruption was not an 
“obvious application of Pickering and its progeny.”  Id. at 686.  Thus, the 
6th Circuit concluded that an employer is not required to show actual 
disruption to prevail under the Pickering test.  Id. at 687.  Rather, the court 
held that the appropriate inquiry is whether an employer could reasonably 
predict the employee’s speech would cause disruption.  Id. 
Fourth Amendment Seizures – Vehicle Impound: Brewster v. Beck, 
859 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether a 30-day impound of a vehicle is 
a seizure requiring compliance with the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 1195.  
The court noted that the 7th Circuit, the only other circuit to address the 
question, determined that so long as the initial seizure was supported by 
probable cause, continued possession did not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 1197.  The 7th Circuit concluded that “the City’s 
continued possession of the vehicle neither continued the initial seizure 
nor began another.”  Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
The 9th Circuit disagreed with the 7th Circuit, finding the case relied on 
by the 7th Circuit inapplicable.  The 9th Circuit concluded that a 30-day 
impound of a vehicle requires compliance with the Fourth Amendment.  
Id. 
Freedom of Religion – Establishment Clause: Am. Humanist Ass’n v. 
McCarty, 851 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2017) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether a school district’s policy of 
inviting students to deliver statements which can include invocations, 
before school-board meetings, violated the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause.”  Id. at 523 (internal citations omitted).  The court 
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noted that the 3rd and 6th Circuits held that legislative-prayer exception 
did not carry on to invocations at school board meetings, and that these 
particular cases should be recognized as school-prayer cases.  Id. at 528.  
In contrast, the court noted that the 9th Circuit held that the legislative-
prayer exception applies to school board invocations.  Id.  The 5th Circuit 
held that “a school board is more like a legislature than a school classroom 
or event.”  Id. at 526.  Therefore, the 5th Circuit concluded that under the 
specific facts presented, the school-board-expression practice did not 
offend the Establishment Clause since the practice falls more nearly within 
the legislative-prayer exception.  Id. at 530. 
CONTRACT LAW 
Judicial Interpretation – Claims Arising Under the Contracts 
Clause: Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2017) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a “Contracts Clause violation is 
cognizable as a” claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the United States Code 
Service.  Id. at 346.  The United States Supreme Court held “that the 
Contracts Clause does not protect an individual constitutional right 
enforceable under § 1983, but is rather a structural limitation placed upon 
the power of the States.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Conversely, the 
Supreme Court held that § 1983 may provide for a Commerce Clause 
violation resulting in a cause of action.  Id.  The 9th Circuit held that a 
Contracts Clause violation may give rise to a § 1983 cause of action.  Id.  
The 4th Circuit rejected this approach and held that a § 1983 claim cannot 
be supported by a Contracts Clause violation.  Id. at 346–47.  Ultimately, 
the 6th Circuit joined the 4th Circuit and held that “an alleged Contracts 
Clause violation cannot give rise to a cause of action under § 1983.”  Id. 
at 347. 
EMPLOYMENT/LABOR LAW 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act – Scope & Definitions: 
Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist., 859 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit analyzed “whether the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act applies to a political subdivision of Arizona.”  Id. at 
*1169.  The 9th Circuit noted that the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th Circuits have 
previously held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is 
ambiguous when it comes to determining if the statute also applies to state-
affiliated entities, such as a political subdivision of the state.  Id. at *1173.  
The court also noted that these four circuits held further that section 630(b) 
of the Act, which defines an employer, can have another reasonable 
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interpretation of the status.  Id.  The 9th Circuit, however, rejected this 
claim, stating that the statute is not ambiguous and that the other circuits 
fail to demonstrate how and why the other statutory construction is 
reasonable.  Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit held that the Act applies to political 
subdivisions.  Id. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) – Subgroups: Karlo 
v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether subgroups, such as those over the 
age of 50, can bring disparate impact claims under the ADEA.  Id. at 68.  
The court noted that the 2nd, 6th, and 8th Circuits determined that 
subgroup disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the ADEA.  Id. 
at 75.  The court disagreed with the 2nd, 6th, and 8th Circuits because the 
United States Supreme Court rejected the arguments that those circuits’ 
earlier decisions relied on.  Id. at 75–80.  Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded 
that subgroup disparate impact claims are cognizable given the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the plain meaning of the statute’s text and its 
remedial purpose.  Id. at 86. 
Employee Compensation – Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): Hills 
v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 866 F.3d 610 (5th Cir. 2017) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether the fluctuating workweek method 
should be used when calculating overtime back pay due to a salaried 
employee.  Id. at 613.  The court created a circuit split by declining to 
follow the 4th Circuit’s definition of a “fluctuating workweek.”  Id. at 616.  
The 4th Circuit held that a fluctuating workweek occurs when the number 
of hours an employee works in a particular week alternates according to a 
fixed schedule.  Id.  However, the 5th Circuit rejected this definition and 
noted that the Department of Labor ruling on which the 4th Circuit based 
its reasoning was inconclusive and did not bind the court.  Id. at 616–17.  
The court therefore held that a fluctuating work week only occurs where 
the employee is compensated for however many hours the job demands in 
a particular week and without regard for a predetermined number of hours 
they must work.  Id. at 616. 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) – Exhaustion of 
Administrative Remedies: Hitchcock v. Cumberland Univ. 403(b) DC 
Plan, 851 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2017) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether participants or beneficiaries of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) “must exhaust 
internal plan remedies before suing plan fiduciaries on the basis of an 
alleged violation of duties imposed by the statute.”  Id. at 564.  The court 
104 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 14:91 
noted that the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits determined that 
exhaustion is not required when plaintiffs seek to “enforce statutory 
ERISA rights rather than contractual rights created by the terms of the 
Plan,” while the 7th and 11th Circuits found that the exhaustion 
requirement applies even where plaintiffs assert statutory rights.  Id.  The 
6th Circuit agreed with the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits in 
finding that “the remedy for claims based on violations of ERISA’s 
substantive guarantees was intended to be provided by the courts,” and 
that a breach of fiduciary duty claims are statutory claims because they 
assert rights granted by ERISA.  Id. at 565 now.  Thus, the 6th Circuit 
concluded that ERISA plan participants or beneficiaries do not need to 
exhaust internal remedial procedures before proceeding to federal court 
when they assert statutory violations of ERISA.  Id. at 564. 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) – Administrative Exemption: 
McKeen-Chaplin v. Provident Sav. Bank, 862 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether mortgage underwriters qualify 
for FLSA’s administrative exemption . . . .”  Id. at 849.  The court first 
noted the 2nd Circuit’s holding that mortgage underwriters “fall[] under 
the category of production rather than of administrative work,” and 
therefore do not qualify for the administrative exemption.  Id. at 852.  The 
court then noted the 6th Circuit’s holding that “mortgage underwriters are 
exempt administrators,” because they perform services that are ancillary 
to the bank’s primary production activity.  Id.  Ultimately, the court 
adopted the 2nd Circuit’s holding, reasoning that mortgage underwriters 
should be labeled under the category of production because their duties do 
not entail assessing the business interests of a bank.  Id.  The court further 
explained that, instead, mortgage underwriters assess loan risk and provide 
analyses to their respective banks.  Id.  The court continued that these 
duties are related to the bank’s production, thereby falling outside the 
scope of the administrative exemption.  Id.  As such, the 9th Circuit joined 
the 2nd Circuit in holding that mortgage underwriters fall outside of the 
administrative exemption of the FLSA, and are therefore entitled to 
overtime compensation.  Id. at 852–53. 
Gender & Sex Discrimination – Title IX: Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. 
Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017) 
The 3rd circuit addressed “whether an ex-resident . . . can bring 
private causes of action for sex discrimination under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq, against . . . a 
private teaching hospital operating a residency program.”  Id. at 549.  The 
court analyzed six United States Supreme Court decisions to derive four 
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guiding principles.  Id. at 560–63.  First, “private-sector employees aren’t 
limited to Title VII in their search for relief from workplace 
discrimination . . . despite Title VII’s range and design as a 
comprehensive solution for invidious discrimination in employment.”  Id. 
at 562 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Second, “it is a matter 
of ‘policy’ left for Congress’s constitutional purview whether an 
alternative avenue of relief from employment discrimination might 
undesirably allow circumvention of Title VII’s administrative 
requirements.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  Third,  ”the provision 
implying Title IX’s private cause of action, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), 
encompasses employees, not just students . . . .”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  Fourth, “Title IX’s implied private cause of action extends 
explicitly to employees of federally-funded education programs who 
allege sex-based retaliation claims under Title IX.”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original).  The court then noted the 5th and 7th 
Circuits’ position that Title VII provides the “exclusive remedy for 
individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex in 
federally funded educational institutions.”  Id. at 563 (internal quotations 
omitted).  However, the 3rd Circuit declined to follow this method, and 
instead followed the 1st and 4th Circuits’ decisions recognizing 
employees’ private Title IX claims.  Id. 
Judgment as a Matter of Law – Qualified Immunity: Holt v. 
Pennsylvania, 683 F. App’x 151 (3d Cir. 2017) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether the initiation of an internal 
investigation—in this case an Internal Affairs Division (IAD) 
investigation into a Pennsylvania police officer—can constitute an 
“adverse action” for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim.  Id. 
at 159.  The court explained that the 5th Circuit held that investigation into 
alleged violations of departmental policies does not constitute adverse 
employment action, while the 9th Circuit held that placement on 
administrative leave pending discipline can constitute an adverse action 
for a First Amendment retaliation case.  Id.  The court agreed with the 
Magistrate Judge’s grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
Pennsylvania because the plaintiff’s suit was barred by qualified 
immunity, which protects government officials “from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”  Id.  Ultimately, the court concluded that the state official was 
entitled to qualified immunity, reasoning that “[i]f judges . . . disagree on 
a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject [a public official] to money 
damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.”  Id. (internal 
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citation and quotation marks omitted).  In addition, the court ruled that 
given its precedent, it would have been reasonable for the state official to 
conclude that the initiation of an IAD investigation would not create 
liability under the Equal Protection Clause, thus entitling her to qualified 
immunity.  Id. at 160. 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) – Arbitration Provisions: 
NLRB v. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether federal law permits employers to 
require individual arbitration of employees’ employment-related claims.  
Id. at 401.  The court noted that the 7th and 9th Circuits ruled that 
“arbitration provisions mandating individual arbitration of employment-
related claims violate the NLRA and fall within the FAA’s saving clause.”  
Id.  The court explained, on the other hand, that the 5th and 8th Circuit 
ruled such provisions do not violate the NLRA.  Id.  The 6th Circuit 
disagreed “with the [5th] Circuit’s holding that employers may require 
employees to agree to a mandatory arbitration provision requiring 
individual arbitration of employment-related claims.”  Id. at 405.  
Ultimately, the 6th Circuit held that “[m]andatory arbitration provisions 
that permit only individual arbitration of employment-related claims are 
illegal pursuant to the NLRA and unenforceable pursuant to the FAA’s 
saving clause,” and thus concluded the defendant “violated the NLRA by 
forbidding employees from discussing compensation-related 
information.”  Id. at 405, 411. 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) – Class and Collective Action 
Waiver: Convergys Corp. v. NLRB, No. 15-60860, 2017 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14521 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2017) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether Section 7 of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) “contemplates a right to participate in class and 
collective actions.”  Id. at *4.  The court noted that the 2nd, 8th, and 11th 
Circuits determined that because class and collective actions are 
procedural, they may be waived notwithstanding the NLRA because no 
substantive right is violated.  Id. at *5 n.4.  The 5th Circuit also noted that 
the 7th and 9th Circuits held that the right to class and collective action is 
substantive and cannot be waived.  Id.  The 5th Circuit adhered to its prior 
precedent and held that such actions are procedural.  Id. at *5–6.  
Accordingly, the 5th Circuit concluded that class and collective actions 
may be waived notwithstanding the NLRA.  Id. at *7. 
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Statutory Interpretation – ADEA Claims Recovery: Vaughan v. 
Anderson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 849 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2017) 
The 5th Circuit addressed the availability of recovery for pain and 
suffering damages and punitive damages under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA).  Id. at 590.  The plaintiff conceded that the 
court’s previous ruling in Dean v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th 
Cir. 1977) barred pain and suffering and punitive recoveries for ADEA 
claims but suggested that Dean does not necessarily control all retaliation 
claims under the Act.  Vaughan, 849 F.3d at 591.  The lower court relied 
upon Dean in its decision to bar recovery for pain and suffering and 
punitive damages, but certified its ruling for interlocutory review after 
recognizing a circuit split regarding the availability of that recovery.  Id. 
at 590–91.  The court noted the 7th Circuit held that the 1977 amendments 
to the Fair Labor Standards Act expanded the remedies ordinarily 
available for ADEA violations.  Id. at 592–93.  On the other hand, the 
court noted that the 11th Circuit has continued to follow the 5th Circuit’s 
holding in Dean.  Id. at 592–93.  Ultimately, the 5th Circuit disagreed with 
the 7th Circuit, and adhered to the rule of orderliness, under which a panel 
may not overturn a controlling precedent absent an intervening change in 
law.  Id. at 593.  The court held that Dean contains no suggestion that its 
holding excluded ADEA retaliation actions.  Id. 
Title VII Employer Retaliation – Burden of Proof: Carvalho-
Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2017) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether a plaintiff asserting a Title VII 
retaliation claim must establish but-for causation as part of her prima facie 
case.”  Id. at 253.  The court noted that the 6th and 10th Circuits have 
found that “a plaintiff must prove but-for causation as part of the prima 
facie case of retaliation.”  Id. at 259.  On the other hand, the 4th Circuit 
does not require a showing of but-for causation during the pre-trial stage.  
Id.  The 3rd Circuit joined the 4th Circuit and held that at this stage, a 
plaintiff must merely provide evidence to allow a judge to infer that 
activity protected under Title VII was a likely reason the adverse 
employment action was taken, although a plaintiff must still prove but-for 
causation at trial.  Id. at 257–59. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Contribution Actions – Section 113(f)(3)(B) of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
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(CERCLA): Asarco LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 
2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a non-CERLCA settlement 
agreement gives rise to a contribution action for “persons who have taken 
actions to clean up hazardous waste sites . . . from other parties who are 
also responsible for the contamination.”  Id. at 1113.  The 9th Circuit noted 
the 3rd Circuit’s view that “[s]ection 113(f)(3)(B) does not state that the 
‘response action’ in question must have been initiated pursuant to 
CERCLA.”  Id. at 1119 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  The 
court then noted that, on the other hand, the 2nd Circuit held that 
“§ 113(f)(3)(B) creates a ‘contribution right only when liability for 
CERCLA claims . . . is resolved.’” Id.  at 1120 (internal citation omitted).  
The 9th Circuit explained that “[c]onsideration of CERCLA’s statutory 
context, structure, and broad remedial purpose, combined with EPA’s 
reasonable interpretation,” led it to conclude that “ . . . Congress did not 
intend to limit § 113(f)(3)(B) to response actions and costs incurred under 
CERCLA settlements.”  Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit joined the 3rd Circuit in 
holding that “a non-CERLCA settlement agreement may form the 
necessary predicate for a § 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action.”  Id. at 1120–
21. 
HEALTH LAW 
Collective-Bargaining Agreements – Healthcare Benefits: Reese v. 
CNH Indus. N.V., 854 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 2017) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA) between two parties provided life-long healthcare benefits to 
retirees and their spouses.  Id. at 879.  In his dissent, Justice Sutton pointed 
out that the majority ruling departed from rulings in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th 
and 7th Circuits, which have respected the general durational clauses in 
each of the agreements at issue.  Id. at 889.  The CBA in Reese contained 
a durational clause that limited the benefits of the contract to the six-year 
term of the agreement.  Id.  Nevertheless, the majority held that the 
consideration of extrinsic evidence was proper in determining whether a 
CBA provided retirees with a vested right to lifetime healthcare benefits, 
and found that the plaintiffs’ rights had vested.  Id. at 883.  The majority 
cited the United States Supreme Court’s decision in M&G Polymers USA, 
LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015), which concluded that finding 
ambiguity from silence permits the court to turn to extrinsic evidence to 
determine the intent of the parties.  Reese, 854 F.3d at 882.  A provision 
in the CBA at issue said only that healthcare coverage would continue past 
the date of retirement, but was silent on whether the benefits would 
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continue past the termination date of the agreement.  Id.  However, the 6th 
Circuit decided that when read in conjunction with the whole instrument, 
as Tackett commands, silence regarding the continuation of the benefits 
furthered the ambiguity of the CBA, and that the court should not presume 
that the general-durational expressed everything about the parties’ 
intentions.  Id. 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
Adjustment of Status – Eligibility for Adjustment of Status: Ramirez 
v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed the “question of statutory interpretation 
about the interplay between two subsections of the immigration code—
one involving designation of Temporary Protected Status (‘TPS’) and the 
other involving adjustment of status.”  Id. at 955.  The court noted that the 
6th Circuit held a TPS recipient meets the requirement to be admitted 
because the recipient has lawful nonimmigrant status.  Id. at 959.  The 
court noted that, in contrast, the 11th Circuit held that a TPS recipient does 
not necessarily meet the requirement because the alien must have been 
inspected and admitted.  Id.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the 6th Circuit, 
reasoning that someone who has obtained lawful status as a nonimmigrant 
must have necessarily been inspected and admitted.  Id. at 960.  Thus, the 
court concluded that a TPS recipient is eligible for adjustment to a legal 
permanent resident.  Id. at 956. 
 
The Immigration and Nationality Act – Stop-Time Rule: Pereira v. 
Sessions, 866 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether a non-permanent resident alien’s 
notice to appear under section 1229(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act “that does not contain the date and time of the alien’s initial hearing is 
nonetheless effective to end the alien’s period of continuous physical 
presence” for purposes of the “stop-time” rule.  Id. at 2.  The court noted 
that the 3rd Circuit determined that “the language of § 1229b(d)(1) 
unambiguously requires that the date and time of the hearing be provided 
before the stop-time rule is triggered,” while the 7th Circuit found that 
“even if such an omission renders a notice to appear defective, a defective 
document [may] nonetheless serve[] a useful purpose.”  Id. at 5 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The 1st Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 
7th, and 9th Circuits in finding that “the [Board of Immigration Appeals’] 
construction of the stop-time rule is neither arbitrary and capricious nor 
contrary to the statute.”  Id. at 7.  Thus, the 1st Circuit concluded that the 
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[Board of Immigration Appeals’] “interpretation of the stop-time rule” is 
“a permissible construction of the statute to which [it] defer[red].  Id. at 8.  
As such, the court held that a non-permanent resident alien’s “period of 
continuous physical presence end[s] when [they are] served with a notice 
to appear.”  Id. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Trademark Infringement – Tea Rose-Rectanus Doctrine: Stone 
Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16632 
(9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed what constitutes good faith within the 
context of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, which requires that a junior 
user must establish good faith use in a geographically remote area in order 
to take advantage of the doctrine.  Id. at *18–19.  The court first noted that 
the 8th and 7th Circuits have held that “[t]he junior user’s knowledge of 
the senior user’s prior use of the mark destroys good faith.”   Id. at *20.  
The court then noted that, in contrast, the 10th and 5th Circuits held that 
“knowledge is a factor informing good faith, but the ‘focus is on whether 
the [junior] user had the intent to benefit from the reputation or goodwill 
of the [senior] user.’”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  The 9th Circuit 
explained that “[t]ying good faith to knowledge makes sense in light of the 
policy underlying the doctrinal framework.”  Id. at *25.  Thus, the 9th 
Circuit joined the 8th and 7th Circuits in holding that a junior user cannot 
establish good faith if the junior user had knowledge of the senior user’s 
prior use.  Id. at *26. 
SECURITIES LAW 
Dodd-Frank Act – Whistleblower Protections: Somers v. Digital 
Realty Trust, Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether, in using the term 
‘whistleblower,’ Congress intended to limit protections to those 
who . . . disclose information to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(‘SEC’).”  Id. at 1046.  The court noted that the 5th Circuit does not protect 
those who fail to report to the SEC, “strictly appl[ying] the [Dodd-Frank 
Act (‘DFA’)]’s definition of ‘whistleblower,’” and dismissing a case 
brought by a plaintiff who failed to report directly to the SEC.  Id. at 1046–
47.  The court then noted that, in contrast, the 2nd Circuit “interprets the 
provision to extend protections to all those who make disclosures of 
suspected violations, whether the disclosures are made internally or to the 
SEC.”  Id. at 1047.  The 9th Circuit found the 2nd Circuit’s approach to 
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be “more consistent with Congress’s overall purpose,” looking to the 
“language of the specific statutory subdivision,” as well as the “overall 
operation of the statute.”  Id.  Thus, the 9th Circuit held that “the SEC 
regulation provide[s] protection for those who make internal disclosures.”  
Id. 
TAX LAW 
Charitable Deduction Classification – Conservation Easements: BC 
Ranch II, L.P. v. Commissioner, Nos. 16-60068, 16-60069, 2017 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 14947 (5th Cir. Aug. 11, 2017) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether a homesite adjustment provision 
prevents grants of a conservation easement from satisfying the perpetuity 
requirement of 26 U.S.C. §170(h)(2)(C) (2012), and thus prevents a party 
from taking a charitable deduction.  Id. at *16.  The 4th Circuit held that 
“a provision which allowed the parties to substitute other land for the land 
that was originally restricted under the easement did not meet the 
perpetuity requirement of § 170(h).  Id. at *10.  The 5th Circuit 
distinguished its holding from the 4th Circuit’s decision stating, “[t]he 
easements at issue in this case differ markedly from the easement in [the 
4th Circuit case],” and that “ . . . the instant easements allow only the 
homesite parcels’ boundaries to be changed and then only (1) within the 
tracts that are subject to the easements and (2) without increasing the 
acreage of the homesite parcel in question.”  Id. at *11 (emphasis in 
original).  The court further explained that the instant easements “ . . . do 
not allow any change in the exterior boundaries of the easements or in their 
acreages.”  Id.  As such, “neither the exterior boundaries nor the total 
acreage of the instant easements will ever change: Only the lot lines of one 
or more the five-acre homesite parcels are potentially subject to change 
and then only (1) within the easements and (2) with NALT’s consent.”  Id.  
Moreover, the court noted that unlike the 4th Circuit case, easements that 
cannot be moved in part or in its entirety do not pose the same issues in 
determining deductions for perpetuity.  Id.  Ultimately, the 5th Circuit 
created a circuit split in holding that “the homesite adjustment provision 
does not prevent the grants of the conservation easements here at issue 
from satisfying the perpetuity requirement of §170(h)(2)(C) and thus does 
not prevent the grantors of these easement from taking the applicable 
charitable deductions.”  Id. at *16. 
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CRIMINAL 
ASSAULT 
Scope of Generic Aggravated Assault – Reckless Conduct: United 
States v. Villasenor-Ortiz, 675 Fed. App’x 424 (5th Cir. 2017) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether offenses that are committed 
recklessly are within the scope of generic aggravated assault.”  Id. at 428 
n.10.  The court recognized that the 4th Circuit expressly disagreed with 
the 5th Circuit on this issue.  Id.  The 4th Circuit determined that offenses 
committed recklessly are not within the scope of generic aggravated 
assault.  Id.  However, in a prior opinion, the 5th Circuit held that reckless 
conduct does not necessarily fall outside the scope of generic aggravated 
assault.  Id. at 428.  Based upon prior precedent and the court’s rule of 
orderliness, the court was compelled to maintain the position that offenses 
committed recklessly are within the scope of generic aggravated assault.  
Id. at 428 n.10. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Fifth Amendment – Scope of Protection: Vogt v. City of Hays, 844 
F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2017) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the protections afforded by the 
Fifth Amendment are limited only to the trial.  Id. at 1240.  The court noted 
that the 3rd, 4th and 5th Circuits determined that the Fifth Amendment is 
only a trial right, while the 2nd, 7th, and 9th Circuits found that certain 
pretrial uses of compelled statements violate the Fifth Amendment.  Id.  
The 10th Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 7th, and 9th Circuits, and found that 
the “common understanding of the phrase “criminal case” encompasses 
all proceedings in a criminal prosecution and the Framers’ “understanding 
of the right against self-incrimination” indicated that Fifth Amendment 
protections extend to pretrial proceedings.  Id. at 1242.  Thus, the 10th 
Circuit concluded that the right against self-incrimination is more than a 
trial right.  Id. 
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CRIMINAL LAW 
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) – Fla. Stat. § 843.01: United 
States v. Lee, No.16-6288, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11680 (10th Cir. 
2017) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “wiggling and struggling” 
during an arrest satisfies the element of violence in Fla. Stat. § 843.01.  Id. 
at *6–7 n.1.  The court noted that the 11th Circuit, in holding that a 
conviction under section 843.01 is an ACCA predicate, 
“emphasized . . . cases where defendants had engaged in more substantial, 
and more violent, conduct . . . ” than the “wiggling and struggling” at issue 
in the instant case.  Id.  The 10th Circuit disagreed with this approach, 
explaining that its job “is not to find what kind of conduct is most routinely 
prosecuted, and evaluate that[,]” but rather, “[u]nder the categorical 
approach, we consider only the ‘minimum conduct criminalized,’ not the 
typical conduct punished.”  Id.  As such, the 10th Circuit concluded that 
“‘wiggling and struggling’ during an arrest is enough to sustain a 
conviction under § 843.01.”  Id. at *6. 
Jury Instruction – Unanimity: United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 
1122 (11th Cir. 2017) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether a jury must unanimously agree 
on the specific type of unlawful sexual activity that a sex offender engaged 
in with a minor in order to convict the defendant of coercion and 
enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C § 2422(b).  Id. at 1132.  The court 
held that the government “need only prove, and the jury unanimously 
agree, that the defendant attempted to persuade a minor to engage in sexual 
activity that would have been chargeable as a crime if it had been 
completed.”  Id.  There is no requirement under 18 U.S.C § 2422(b) that 
the jury had to unanimously agree on the specific type of unlawful sexual 
activity that the defendant would have engaged in.  Id.  This holding 
aligned with the 6th and 11th circuits’ precedent. Id.  Alternatively, the 7th 
Circuit determined that the jury should be instructed that it can “only 
convict if it unanimously agrees that the defendant has violated one of the 
[relevant] statutes.” Id. at 1133. 
Victim Witness and Protection Act – “Residual” or “Omnibus” 
Clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503: United States v. Davis, 854 F.3d 1276 (11th 
Cir. 2017) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the “residual” or “omnibus” 
clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 of the Victim Witness Protection Act 
(“VWPA”) continued to cover witness tampering.  Id. at 1287.  The court 
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noted the 2nd Circuit’s determination that witness tampering would be 
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512, as opposed to § 1503, while the 
majority of circuits held that the residual clause of § 1503 continued to 
encompass witness tampering.  Id.  The 11th Circuit agreed with the 1st 
and 4th Circuits in holding that the scope of § 1503 is broad to cover 
witness tampering, since the subsequent amendment to § 1512 was 
intended to close a gap in that statute, rather than to alter the language of 
the residual clause.  Id. at 1288–89.  The court expressly disagreed with 
the 2nd Circuit that Congress used this subsequent amendment in 1988 to 
broaden the scope of § 1512 and remove any need for residual coverage 
under §1503.  Id. at 1288.  Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded that “witness 
tampering remains punishable under [the residual clause of] § 1503.”  Id. 
at 1289. 
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) – Abduction: United States v. Archuleta, 865 
F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017) 
The 10th Circuit addressed “whether the forced movement of victims 
from one room or area to another room or area within the same building 
constitutes an abduction for purposes of § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A).”  Id. at 1285.  
The court noted that the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Circuits “have all held that an 
abduction occurs for purposes of § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) when a defendant 
forces a victim from one room or area of a building to another room or 
area within the same building.”  Id.  The court next explained that the 7th 
Circuit’s decisions on the matter have varied.  Id. at 1286–87.  The court 
then noted that the 11th Circuit has held that “a bank branch is a single 
location and that, consequently, movement of victims within a bank 
branch to individual offices or rooms does not constitute movement to a 
different location for the purposes of § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A).”  Id.  Ultimately, 
the 10th circuit adopted the 3rd Circuit’s three-pronged test.  Id. at 1288. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Crime of Violence Offense – Constitutional Vagueness: United States 
v. Sneed, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13905 (11th Cir. 2017) 
The 11th Circuit addressed “whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) was 
unconstitutionally vague under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015),” in which the United States Supreme Court “ . . . invalidated 
the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (‘ACCA’) ’residual clause’ as 
unconstitutionally vague.”  Sneed, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13905, at *4–
5.  The 11th Circuit noted that the 8th, 2nd, and 6th Circuits have found 
that “Johnson does not apply to or invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B),” while the 
7th Circuit found that “Johnson invalidated § 924(c)(3)(B).”  Id.  The 11th 
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Circuit “agreed with the decisions of the 2nd, 6th, and 8th Circuits that 
there were significant material textual differences between the definition 
of ‘crime of violence’ in § 924(c)(3)(B) and the residual-clause definition 
of ‘violent felony’ in the ACCA’s § 924(c)(2)(B).  Id. at *6.  Thus, the 
11th Circuit held that “Johnson does not apply to or invalidate 
§ 924(c)(3)(B).”  Id. 
First Amendment – Public Employee Speech Protection: Mayhew v. 
Town of Smyrna, 856 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2017) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether an employee’s complaints about 
a coworker’s misconduct fell outside the scope of his ordinary job 
responsibilities, in an attempt to determine what degree of First 
Amendment protections are afforded to public employee speech.  Id. at 
464.  The court first noted that the United States Supreme Court has stated 
that the critical question “is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily 
within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns 
those duties.”  Id. (citing Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014)).  
The 6th Circuit acknowledged that a circuit split exists over whether the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Lane v. Franks requires the question of 
whether a public employee’s speech is protected to be one of both fact and 
law, or rather one of only law.  Id. at 462.  The court stated that the 3rd, 
7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits have concluded that whether the speech was 
made  as a public employee or as a private citizen is a mixed question of 
law and fact.  Id.  On the other hand, the D.C. Court of Appeals,  as well 
as the 5th and 10th Circuits found that a question regarding protected 
status of speech is a question of only law.  Id.  Ultimately, the 6th Circuit 
joined the D.C. Court of Appeals and the 5th and 10th Circuits in holding 
that the lower court did not err in concluding that the protected speech was 
a question of law.  Id. at 464. 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act – Offenses Against Property: 
United States v. Collins, 854 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) 
The 11th Circuit examined the definition of an “offense against 
property” under subsection (c) of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 
(MVRA).  Id. at 1330.  The court noted that the 10th Circuit has held that 
such an offense must have “the objective of knowingly and intentionally 
damaging property,” while the 6th and 9th Circuits have included any 
offense which “results in physical harm to a property,” and the 3rd and 9th 
Circuits have included offenses which simply “involve[] the intentional 
deprivation, or attempted deprivation, of another’s property.”  Id.  The 
11th Circuit also noted that 11th Circuit precedent has included “various 
types of fraud, and their attendant false or misleading representations.”  Id. 
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at 1331.  However, the court reasoned that the MVRA’s framework 
suggests that collateral damage to property is not necessarily an “offense 
against property” because subsection (b)(1) already covers “offense[s] 
resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim.”  Id. 
at 1331–32.  The 11th Circuit joined the 10th Circuit in holding that an 
“offense against property” must intentionally damage property.  Id. at 
1331–33. 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) – Redirection of 
Disclaimed Payments: United States v. Hankins, 858 F.3d 1273 (9th 
Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether a district court may redirect 
restitution payments to the federal Crime Victims Fund . . . when a victim 
later disclaims restitution without making a direct assignment to the fund.”  
Id. at 1275.  The court acknowledged that while the MVRA requires 
restitution and does not allow its expiration or modification except under 
limited circumstances, the victim is not required to accept the restitution 
payments; however, the MVRA does not state where the payments must 
go if rejected.  Id. at 1278–79.  The court recognized that the 7th and 10th 
Circuits have held that the MVRA bars redirection and essentially allows 
victims to stop restitution payments.  Id. at 1280.  However, the 9th Circuit 
noted that this approach either allows defendants to stop paying restitution 
or leaves restitution payments unclaimed, both sidestepping the MVRA’s 
goal to ensure that defendants repay their debt to society.  Id. at 1279–80.  
Accordingly, the 9th Circuit created a circuit split by holding that the 
MVRA allows district courts to redirect disclaimed restitution payments 
to the Crime Victims Fund.  Id. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct – Perjured Testimony in Habeas Context: 
Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2017) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether habeas petitioners must meet 
Brecht’s actual-prejudice hurdle.”  Id.  at 150.  The court noted that the 9th 
circuit has rejected applying the Brecht test to perjured testimony, whereas 
the 1st, 6th, 8th, and 11th have applied Brecht to perjured testimony claims 
in habeas petitions.  Id.  The court also noted that 6th Circuit agreed with 
the 1st Circuit and found that the 9th Circuit “erred in failing to distinguish 
false-testimony claims from Brady withholding claims.”  Id.  The 11th 
Circuit agreed several years later, followed by the 8th Circuit, which found 
that “the materiality standard for false testimony is lower, more favorable 
to the defendant, and hostile to the prosecution as compared to the standard 
for a  general Brady withholding violation.”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  Ultimately, the 3rd Circuit joined the 9th Circuit in holding that 
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Brecht does not apply to perjured testimony in habeas cases because the 
concerns in Brecht’s harmless error standard do not reach cases of perjured 
testimony.  Id.  at 150–51. 
Restitution – Defaced Currency: United States v. Anderson, No. 16-
3134, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14484 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2017) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether defaced currency recovered by the 
government should be subtracted from a defendant’s restitution obligation 
if the extent of the damage is not disclosed at trial.  Id. at *7–8.  The court 
noted that the 6th Circuit held that it is impossible to know whether the 
Treasury Department would replace the bills because the issue was not 
raised at trial; therefore, the defendant is liable for them.  Id. at *12–13.  
The court also noted that the 8th Circuit followed a similar approach, but 
recently switched positions, holding that failing to subtract the value of 
recovered stolen property would result in double recovery to the victim.  
Id. at *13–14.  The 7th Circuit reasoned that because currency can be 
replaced unless less than one half remains or its denomination is doubtful, 
the intact and replaceable currency’s value can be returned after remand.  
Id. at *11–12.  The 7th Circuit thus concluded that unless the government 
proves the currency is defaced beyond replacement, it must be returned, 
and must be subtracted from the defendant’s restitution obligation.  Id. at 
*14–15. 
Sentence-Reduction Proceedings – Explanatory Requirements: 
United States v. Chavez-Meza, 854 F.3d 655 (10th Cir. 2017) 
The 10th Circuit addressed “the degree of explanation necessary to 
satisfy [18 U.S.C.] § 3582” during sentence-reduction proceedings in 
district court.  Id. at 660.  The court noted that the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Circuits 
“have all held that no elaborate explanation is necessary” and that the 
appellate court could infer pertinent factors from the record.  Id.  However, 
the court also noted that the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Circuits have 
all “found an explanatory requirement” because a lack of reasoning 
prevents the appellate court from effectively reviewing the decision.  Id.  
The 10th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Circuits because § 3582 
does not explicitly require additional explanation, and refused to impose 
an explanatory requirement not found in the statute.  Id. at 661.  Thus, the 
10th Circuit held that no further explanation was required from the district 
court.  Id.  
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Sentencing – Saving Clause: McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-
Suncoast, 851 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2017) 
The 11th Circuit considered whether a “change in case law entitle[d] 
a federal prisoner to an additional round of collateral review of his 
sentence.”  Id. at 1079.  To answer this question, the 11th Circuit was 
required to determine whether “a change in case law [satisfies] the saving 
clause of [28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)].”  Id. at 1081.  In determining whether the 
saving clause was satisfied, the court noted how there is no “settled 
consensus about the meaning of the saving clause.”  Id. at 1097.  The court 
explained how the 7th, 4th, 5th, 6th, 2nd, 3rd, 8th, 9th and 10th circuits 
have all developed various tests in determining whether a federal prisoner 
satisfied the savings clause.  Id. at 1084–85.  The court noted, however, 
that every court except the 10th Circuit “focused on legislative purpose 
and avoided rigorous textual analysis.”  Id. at 1097.  The 11th Circuit was 
persuaded to follow the 10th Circuit’s approach since it was the only 
circuit to “ha[ve] adhered to – or even seriously considered – the text of 
the saving clause.”  Id. at 1085.  After engaging in a detailed textual 
analysis of the statute, the court held that a change in case law did not 
render the motion to vacate an “inadequate and ineffective test to the 
legality of his detention.”  Id. at 1080, 1099.  The 11th Circuit, therefore, 
concluded that it—like the 10th Circuit—must “apply [the text of the 
statute] to the parties before us.”  Id. at 1099. 
Special Parole – Reimposition of Revoked Parole Term: Fillingham v. 
United States, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14925 (5th Cir. 2017) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether our decision in Artuso v. Hall, 
74 F.3d 68 (1996), holding that the [United States Parole] Commission 
cannot reimpose a revoked special parole term, remains valid after 
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000).”  Id. at *6.  In Johnson, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Commission is allowed to 
reimpose supervised release because it determined that the definition of 
“revoke” in the sentencing guidelines meant “recall.”  Id. at *8.  Given this 
definition, the Supreme Court then found that the ability to recall does not 
mean that a prisoner loses the ability to have supervised release; instead, 
once supervised release is revoked and a new prison term is imposed, 
supervised release could again be granted.  Id.  The 5th Circuit noted that 
the 7th Circuit has held that the Commission cannot reimpose special 
parole while the 2nd Circuit held that the Commission is empowered to do 
so.  Id. at *6.  The 5th Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit and held that Johnson 
allows the Commission to reinstate special parole following previous 
revocation.  Id. 
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Substantial-Assistance Motion – Good Faith Review: United States v. 
Doe, No. 17-604, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14371 (10th Cir. Aug. 4, 2017) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the government’s failure to file 
a substantial-assistance motion, in accordance with a plea agreement 
giving it sole discretion to do so, may be reviewed for good faith.  Id. at 
*3–4.  The court noted that the 3rd Circuit determined that a district court 
may examine a prosecutor’s refusal to file such a motion for good faith 
even if the plea agreement grants the government sole discretion to file, 
while the 5th Circuit found that only allegedly unconstitutional motives 
can be reviewed.  Id. at *4–5.  The 10th Circuit also noted that potentially 
conflicting United States Supreme Court precedent did not disturb existing 
10th Circuit precedent authorizing good-faith review because the Supreme 
Court emphasized that no agreement to file a substantial-assistance motion 
existed.  Id. at *6–7.  Regardless, the 10th Circuit incorporated the 
Supreme Court’s constitutionality threshold test into its contractual good-
faith inquiry.  Id. at *10–11.  Thus, the 10th Circuit held that “[i]n order to 
trigger good-faith review . . . a defendant must first allege that the 
government acted in bad faith[,]” and the government must “then rebut 
that allegation by providing its reasons for refusing to file” the substantial-
assistance motion.  Id. at *11.  Good-faith review is then permitted when 
the defendant can give reason to question the government’s good-faith 
justification for refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion.  Id. 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit – Sentencing 
Guidelines: United States v. Burke, 863 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 2017) 
The 11th Circuit addressed the issue of whether the term “prior 
sentence” in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) refers to the defendant’s original 
sentence or the resentencing sentence for purposes of calculating a 
defendant’s criminal history category.  Id. at 1357.  The court noted that 
the 8th and 9th Circuits held that “when a defendant’s initial sentence is 
vacated, a sentencing court shall add criminal history points for any 
unrelated sentences imposed after the initial sentencing but before 
resentencing.”  Id. at 1359.  The 1st Circuit reached a different conclusion, 
opining that “the Guidelines’ reference to ‘prior sentence’ means, in this 
context, a sentence which is prior to the original sentence which was 
vacated and remanded only for resentencing.”  Id.  The 11th Circuit agreed 
with the 8th and 9th Circuits in finding that when the initial sentence has 
been vacated, criminal history points are to be added for unrelated 
sentences imposed in between the initial sentencing and resentencing.  Id.  
The court reached this holding based on the text of section 4A1.2(a), along 
with its related commentary, as well as its own precedent in holding that 
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when the 11th Circuit vacates a sentence it “becomes void in its entirety” 
unlike the 1st Circuit.  Id.  Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded that the 
Defendant’s unrelated sentences imposed after the initial sentencing and 
before resentencing shall be included in determining criminal history 
points.  Id. 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
Withholding of Removal Following Illegal Reentry Into the United 
States – Immigration and Nationality Act: Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 
862 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2017) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether an alien against whom the 
government has reinstated removal proceedings may challenge the validity 
of that order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), or whether the order is 
administratively final pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1331(a), where the alien 
petitioned for withholding of removal out of fear of persecution and torture 
if he were removed to his native country.  Id. at 884.  The court noted that 
the 2nd Circuit determined that an alien’s removability is not 
administratively final where his petition for withholding of removal is 
pending.  Id. at 888.  Accordingly, the 2nd Circuit held that “the purpose 
of withholding-only proceedings is to determine precisely whether ‘the 
alien is to be removed from the United States,’” and therefore the alien 
may petition for relief under § 1226(a).  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The 9th Circuit concluded that the removal order was final 
because the purpose of withholding of removal proceedings is to 
determine “whether the alien is to be removed to a particular country,” 
rather than “removed from the United States.”  Id. at 888–89 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the court held that § 1331(a) applied, 
rather than § 1226(a), and the alien could not challenge the validity of the 
removal order.  Id. at 886. 
PROPERTY CRIMES 
Actus Reas – The Definition of Aggravated- Burglary: United States 
v. Stitt, 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “statutes criminalizing the 
burglary of vehicles and movable enclosures . . . fall outside the generic 
definition of burglary[,]” even if the statute is “limited to ‘habitations’ or 
‘occupied structures.’”  Id. at 861.  The court acknowledged that the 3rd, 
4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits held that such statutes do fall outside the 
generic definition, while the 10th Circuit rejected this position.  Id.  If the 
definition did fall outside the “general definition,” then Tennessee 
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aggravated-burglary constitutes a violent-felony then has repercussions 
when sentencing a defendant after another conviction.  Id.  This decision 
overruled a previous 6th Circuit decision in which the court failed “to 
scrutinize the statutory definition of ‘habitation,’ which includes vehicles, 
tents, and other movable enclosures.”  Id.  As such, the court admitted that 
it “incorrectly concluded . . . that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated-
burglary therefore constituted a violent felony.”  Id. at 861.  Thus, the 6th 
Circuit joined the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits, and determined that 
such convictions do not constitute violent felonies.  Id. 
SENTENCING 
Sentencing – Availability of Reduction After Statutory Amendment: 
United States v. Koons, 850 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2017) 
The 8th Circuit addressed whether 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) relief was 
newly available to five defendants convicted of methamphetamine 
conspiracy offenses because Amendment 782 to the Guidelines 
retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense levels assigned to drug 
quantities.  Id. at 974.  The court explained that § 3582(c)(2) allows a 
district court to reduce the sentence of a “defendant who has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has 
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . .”  Id. at 
976.  The court acknowledged a conflict in the circuits regarding both how 
to determine eligibility when the applicable guidelines range is affected by 
a mandatory minimum, and what to use as the floor of the amended range.  
Id. at 976.  The court noted the 6th, 7th, and 8th circuits have held that a 
retroactive amendment did not have the effect of lowering a defendant’s 
applicable guidelines range because the amended and original ranges were 
both determined by the mandatory minimum.  Id.  The court further 
explained that the Sentencing Commission subscribed to “the approach of 
the [3rd] Circuit and D.C. Circuits—when a defendant’s initial guidelines 
range was entirely below the mandatory minimum, the bottom of the 
amended range is the bottom of the Sentencing Table guideline range.” Id. 
at 976 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  The 8th Circuit 
disagreed with the 4th Circuit ruling that a sentence would not be based 
on a range the Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered, because it 
was not initially based on a sentencing range.  Id. at 977.  Rather, the court 
concluded that the defendants were “ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) sentencing 
reductions because their initial sentences were not ‘based on’ a guidelines 
range lowered by Amendment 782.”  Id. at 979. 
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Sentencing Enhancements Due to Prior Criminal Convictions – 
Armed Career Criminals Act: United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267 (6th 
Cir. 2017) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a sentencing judge, under United 
States Supreme Court precedent, must refrain from finding facts in the 
“first instance, [and] merely [identify] findings or admissions that were 
previously made under constitutional safeguards” in determining whether 
prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” 
under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA).  Id. at 273.  The court 
noted that the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 10th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits have 
concluded that a sentencing judge’s evidentiary sources for determining 
whether prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one 
another” are limited to conclusive findings by the trier-of-fact and the 
defendant’s own admissions pursuant to a guilty plea.  Id.  On the other 
hand, the 8th Circuit concluded that “evidentiary restrictions are not 
applicable in determining whether offenses were committed on different 
occasions.”  Id.  The 6th Circuit concluded that allowing a sentencing 
judge to make factual findings as to the first-occasion question is contrary 
to Supreme Court Sixth Amendment precedent because the judge would 
“[become] the trier of fact regarding when and where the prior offenses 
occurred . . . .”  Id.  Therefore, the court agreed with the majority of circuit 
courts and held that a sentencing judge is limited to the factual findings of 
the trier-of-fact and the defendant’s own constitutionally valid admissions 
in determining whether prior offenses were “committed on occasions 
different from one another” under the ACCA.  Id. 
STATUTES 
United States Sentencing Guidelines – 18 U.S.C. § 924(b): United 
States v. Guillen-Cruz, 853 F.3d 768 (5th Cir. 2017) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether a defendant’s “22 U.S.C. § 2778 
conviction proves an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(b).”  Id. at 773.  
The court noted that the 4th Circuit determined that “proof of all the 
elements of 22 U.S.C. § 2778 automatically proves a [18 U.S.C.] § 924(b) 
violation.”  Id. at 774.  However, the court disagreed with the 4th Circuit, 
stating that under the 4th Circuit’s approach, “a conviction under 22 
U.S.C. § 2778(b) and (c) could be sustained if an individual exported a 
warship or ‘[r]adar systems and equipment,’ 22 C.F.R. § 121.1, items 
which are plainly not anticipated by the firearms or ammunition offenses 
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 924(b).”  Id.  The court explained that the 7.62x39 
magazines at issue in this instance “are neither ‘firearms’ nor 
‘ammunition’ for purposes of § 924(b).”  Id.  Thus, the 5th Circuit held 
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that proof of all elements of § 2778 does not automatically prove a 
§ 924(b) violation.  Id. 
 
